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BELONGING	  TO	  LAW:	  
RELIGIOUS	  DIFFERENCE,	  SECULARISM,	  AND	  THE	  CONDITIONS	  OF	  CIVIC	  INCLUSION	  
	  
	  
Benjamin	  L.	  Berger*	  
	  
	  
	   Within	  the	  modern	  politics	  of	  liberal	  secularism,	  can	  law	  serve	  as	  the	  
conceptual	  basis	  for	  civic	  identity	  and	  belonging?	  
	   A	  common	  way	  of	  imagining	  law	  is	  as	  technique.	   	  Law	  is	  a	  tool	  at	  the	  
disposal	  of	  states	  and	  –	  for	  the	  more	  pluralistically	  ambitious	  –	  transnational	  
and	   subnational	   communities	   to	   achieve	   functional	   ends.	   	   In	   this	   way	   of	  
thinking	   about	   it	   –	   perhaps	   a	   “folk”	   understanding	   (Moore,	   1978)	   –	   law	  
belongs	  to	  us.	  	  Law	  is	  something	  that	  communities	  develop,	  that	  communities	  
hold	   and	  deploy,	   and	   in	   this	   sense	   one	   can	   speak	   of	   law	   in	   the	   possessive:	  
Canada’s,	  England’s,	  or	  France’s	  legal	  system.	  	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  of	  
imaging	   the	   lines	  of	  belonging	  between	   law	  and	  community.	   	  One	   thinks	  of	  
Jewish	  law,	  in	  which	  a	  community	  is	  defined	  and	  constituted	  by	  its	  relation	  to	  
law;	  Jews	  are	  those	  who	  belong	  to	  the	  Torah,	  who	  belong	  to	  law.	  	  In	  Canada,	  
one	   cannot	   but	   think	   of	   Indigenous	   legal	   traditions,	   in	   which	   law	   is	   not	  
created	   or	   deployed	   by	   communities	   as	   much	   as	   it	   is	   engaged	   with	   as	   a	  
means	   to	   constitute	   and	   affirm	   communities.	   	   (Borrows,	   2010)	   	  Nor	   is	   this	  
sense	  of	   the	  configuration	  of	   law	  and	  belonging	   foreign	   to	  modern	  national	  
political	   contexts.	   	   The	   imaginative	   heart	   of	   American	   republicanism	   is	   the	  
idea	  of	  a	  community	  constituted	  under	  law,	  the	  Constitution	  being	  something	  
that	  one	  could	   intelligibly	  claim	  to	  be	  defending,	  making	   law	  something	   for	  
which	  one	  would	  fight	  and	  die	  (Kahn,	  1997).	  
The	  political	  and	  social	  challenge	  of	   religious	  diversity	   is,	   in	  sizeable	  
measure,	   a	   challenge	   of	   community	   self-­‐definition.	   	   Religious	   difference	  
makes	   patent	   the	   diversity	   that	   subsists	   behind	   the	   patinas	   of	   value	  
convergence	  characteristic	  of	  too	  much	  modern	  nationalist	  politics.	  (Webber,	  
1994)	  	  Religious	  diversity	  is	  one	  fact	  that	  stirs	  us	  from	  the	  oneiric	  aspiration	  
of	   a	   political	   community	   bound	   together	   by	   shared	   worldviews	   and	   lends	  
urgency	  to	  the	  search	  for	  a	  common	  ground	  of	  community	  belonging.	  	  How	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* This piece benefitted greatly from conversation with Robert Hefner, Adam Seligman, the other 
participants in “Civic Enculturation and Citizenship in North America and Western Europe” 
conference held by the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs at Boston University in 
2012.  Thank you also to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions, and to 
Hannah Askew, Geneviève Murray, and Samara Secter for their outstanding research assistance 
and their incisive comments on earlier drafts of this piece. 
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a	  secular	  state	  –	  one	  committed,	   in	  some	  fashion,	  to	  the	  disentanglement	  of	  
political	   authority	   and	   religious	   and	   metaphysical	   claims	   –	   to	   respond	   to	  
deep	  religious	  difference	  while	  maintaining	  some	  workable	  sense	  of	  political	  
community?	   	   The	   lessons	   of	   modern	   history,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   facts	   of	  
transnational	  mobility	  and	  migration,	  preclude	  any	  straightforward	  or	  overt	  
political	  self-­‐definition	  on	  ethnic	  or	  racial	  lines.	   	  Common	  currencies,	  access	  
to	  markets,	  and	  social	  welfare	  entitlements	  do	  not	  seem	  sufficiently	  robust	  to	  
carry	  the	  weight	  of	  community	  belonging,	  as	  the	  European	  experiment	  seems	  
to	  consistently	  show	  (See	  Haltern,	  2003).	  	  But	  what	  about	  law?	  	  Met	  with	  the	  
challenges	  of	  community	  definition	  occasioned	  by	  deep	  religious	  difference,	  
should	   secular	   liberalism	   look	   to	   law	   as	   a	   candidate	   to	   sustain	   community	  
belonging?	  	  	  	  	  
And	  so	  I	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  imagine	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  the	  
modern	  politics	   of	   religious	  difference.	   	   In	   a	   liberal	   secular	   paradigm,	   does	  
law	  belong	  to	  us,	  or	  do	  we	  belong	  to	  law?	  
	   To	  some,	  this	  question	  is	  flawed	  at	  its	  foundation	  because	  it	  assumes	  a	  
mistaken	   premise:	   that	   there	   is	   one	   historical	   or	   sociological	   phenomenon	  
called	   “secularism.”	   	   In	   the	  past	  many	  years	  an	   important	  body	  of	   research	  
has	   developed	   that	   emphasizes	   the	   broad	   range	   of	   political	   and	   legal	  
configurations	   that	   subsist	   under	   the	   general	   mantle	   of	   secularism,	   a	   rich	  
variety	   of	   secularisms	   that	   is	   obscured	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   single	   modern	  
phenomenon.	  	  Jakobsen	  and	  Pelligrini	  (2008)	  urge	  a	  pluralization	  of	  the	  idea	  
of	   the	   secular,	   offering	   a	   range	   of	   studies	   of	   the	   ways	   that	   religion	   and	  
political	  power	  can	  be	  disentangled	  in	  various	  historical	  and	  social	  contexts.	  	  
Ahmet	  Kuru’s	   examination	  of	   secularism	   in	  France,	  Turkey,	   and	   the	  United	  
States	   draws	   out	   the	   diverse	   methods	   and	   mechanisms	   used	   to	   give	   local	  
shape	   to	   the	   secular	   in	   each	  national	   setting,	   emphasizing	   in	  particular	   the	  
influence	   of	   political	   history	   and	   reactions	   to	   an	   ancien	   régime	   in	   the	  
development	   of	   various	   approaches	   to	   realizing	   secularism	   (Kuru,	   2009).	  	  
These	  and	  other	  works	  have	  been	  insistent	  in	  their	  call	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  range	  
of	   local	   approaches	   to	   decoupling	   religion	   and	   political	   authority	   and	   the	  
diverse	  social,	   institutional,	  and	   legal	  dynamics	   involved	   in	   the	  “varieties	  of	  
secularism”	   (See,	   e.g.,	   Warner	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Whitman,	   2008).	   The	   forms	   of	  
secularism	   are	   also	   made	   various	   in	   part	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   political	   and	  
emotional	   polysemy	   of	   religion	   itself:	   “[t]he	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   concept	   of	  
‘religion’	  operates	  in	  [a]	  culture	  as	  motive	  and	  as	  effect,	  how	  it	  mutates,	  what	  
it	   affords	   and	   obstructs,	   what	   memories	   it	   shelters	   or	   excludes,	   are	   not	  
eternally	   fixed”	   (Asad,	   2006:	   106).	   	   “That,”	   Asad	   insists,	   “is	   what	   makes	  
varieties	   of	   secularism…	   always	   unique”	   (Asad,	   2006:	   106).	   	   It	   seems	  
dangerously	  reductive	  to	  speak	  of	  what	  happens	  within	  “the	  modern	  politics	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of	   secularism”	   or	   what	   features	   characterize	   “secularism.”	   	   Too	   much	   of	  
interest	  and	  importance	  is	  elided	  when	  this	  diverse	  range	  of	  phenomena	  are	  
assembled	  under	  a	  capacious	  umbrella	  of	  “the	  secular”.	  	  	  
	   Yet	   there	   nevertheless	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   set	   of	   commonalities,	   linkages,	  
and	  “family	  resemblances”	  between	  manifestations	  of	  the	  secular,	  shared	  or	  
analogous	  features	  across	  these	  varieties	  of	  the	  secular	  that	  make	  it	  not	  only	  
intelligible	  but	  also	  edifying	  to	  speak	  in	  broader	  terms.	  	  And	  so	  there	  is	  also	  
something	   lost	   in	   an	   insistent	   focus	  on	   the	  particular.	   	  As	  one	   author	   aptly	  
puts	  it,	  thinking	  of	  secularism	  only	  in	  local	  and	  particular	  terms	  presents	  the	  
risk	  of	  underestimating	  “the	  globalizing	  power	  of	  the	  behaviors,	  knowledges,	  
sensibilities,	   and	   political	   arrangements	   that	   have	   come	   to	   comprise	   the	  
secular”	  (Fernando,	  2010:	  31).	   	  In	  a	  transnational	  and	  not	  yet	  entirely	  post-­‐
colonial	   era,	   political	   and	   legal	   common	   sense	   have	   a	   distinctive	   mobility,	  
lending	  importance	  to	  the	  work	  of	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  identify	  patterns,	  trends,	  
and	  attitudes	  that	  appear	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  secular	  (See,	  e.g.,	  Asad,	  
2003;	   Taylor,	   2007).	   	   Certain	   experiences	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   secularism	   are	  
common	   enough	   across	   local	   contexts,	   and	   deviations	   from	   these	   larger	  
trends	  seem	  significant	  enough,	  that	  these	  broader	  brush-­‐stroke	  analyses	  are	  
also	  indispensible.	  	  	  
	   It	   seems,	   then,	   that	   we	   should	   seek	   to	   analyse	   the	   politics	   of	  
secularism	  while	  somehow	  holding	  together	  the	  imperatives	  and	  insights	  of	  
both	   the	  particular	   and	   the	   general.	   	  With	   this	  methodological	   challenge	   in	  
mind,	  secularism	  is	  perhaps	  best	  approached	  as	  repertoire	  of	  moves	  available	  
in	   the	  project	  of	  untethering	  religion	  and	  political	  authority.	   	  Local	   context,	  
social	   and	   political	   history,	   and	   institutional	   structures	   will	   condition	   the	  
moves	  that	  have	  particular	  purchase	  or	  appeal	  in	  a	  given	  national	  or	  regional	  
tradition;	   certain	   tools	   will	   lie	   more	   readily	   at	   hand	   depending	   on	   these	  
factors.	  	  Yet	  one	  can	  still	  intelligibly	  and	  usefully	  speak	  of	  certain	  possibilities	  
and	  resources	  available	  by	  virtue	  of	  participation	  in	  something	  like	  a	  project	  
of	   secularism,	   a	   project	   that	   is	   more	   or	   less	   recognizable	   as	   such	   across	  
diverse	   local	   instantiations.	   	   Within	   that	   broader	   context,	   when	   facing	  
particular	   social	   or	   political	   challenges,	   certain	   of	   these	   resources	   will	  
present	  as	  attractive	  candidates	  for	  use;	  each	  will	  also	  carry	  their	  own	  risks	  
and	  pathologies.	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  this	  repertoire	  –	  what	  makes	  certain	  moves	  
appealing	   or	   troublesome	   and	   what	   social	   and	   political	   dynamics	   they	  
engender	  –	  is	  one	  fruitful	  way	  into	  the	  study	  of	  secularism	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  
religious	  difference.	  	  	  
	   This	   piece	   examines	   one	   such	   move,	   the	   political	   dynamics	   it	  
generates,	   and	   the	   reasons	   for	   its	   appeal,	   within	   one	   social	   and	   historical	  
context.	   	   I	   examine	   a	   particular	   response	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   community	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definition	   that	   has	   become	   evident	   in	   the	   Canadian	   politics	   of	   liberal	  
secularism:	   the	   assertion,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   religious	  
diversity,	  that	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  political	  community	  means,	  above	  all	  else,	  to	  
belong	  to	  law.	   	  Belonging,	   including	  to	  law,	  can	  involve	  a	  range	  of	  attitudes,	  
habits,	  and	  postures.	  	  Rich	  forms	  of	  belonging	  are	  expressed	  not	  only	  through	  
respect	   and	   identification,	   but	   also	   resistance	   and	   dissent.	   	   The	   particular	  
claim	   for	   belonging	   at	   issue	   in	   this	   piece,	   however,	   is	   a	   narrower,	   less	  
compromising	   form	   whereby	   submission	   to	   law	   (understood	   in	   a	   monistic	  
and	  statist	  fashion)	  is	  what	  defines	  political	  community.	   	  The	  move	  at	  issue,	  
then,	   is	   the	  migration	  of	   law	  to	   the	  symbolic	  heart	  of	  community	  belonging	  
such	  that	  the	  normative	  citizen	  is	  defined	  by	  her	  submission	  to	  state	  law.	  	  In	  
this	  increasingly	  invoked	  trope	  of	  legality,	  submission	  to	  law	  substitutes	  for	  
the	  perplexity	  and	  challenges	  of	  community	  definition	  and	  negotiation	  across	  
differences.	   	   In	   the	   modern	   Canadian	   politics	   of	   secularism,	   the	   liberal	  
political	  force	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  being	  used	  to	  shift	  ‘obedience	  to	  
the	   law’	   to	   the	   diagnostic	   centre	   of	   civic	   belonging.	   	   But	   it	   is	   questionable	  
whether	   law	   can	   satisfactorily	   sustain	   this	   role.	   	   Like	   other	   moves	   in	   the	  
repertoire	   of	   secularism,	   this	   symbolic	   configuration	   of	   law	   and	   belonging	  
has	  its	  pathologies	  and	  distorting	  effects.	  	  Among	  the	  various	  tools	  available	  
in	  the	  politics	  of	  secularism,	  should	  we	  look	  to	  the	  law	  as	  the	  ground	  for	  civic	  
inclusion?	  	  	  
The	   heart	   of	   this	   piece	   uses	   case	   studies	   drawn	   from	   Canada	   to	  
explore	  the	  crucial	  place	  that	  this	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  belonging	  is	  
coming	   to	   play	   in	   the	   Canadian	   project	   of	   secular	   civic	   formation	   and	   the	  
effects	  that	  this	  move	  has	  on	  the	  understanding	  and	  management	  of	  religious	  
difference.	  	  The	  paper	  then	  examines	  why	  this	  kind	  of	  symbolic	  appeal	  to	  law	  
is	  so	  attractive,	  enjoying	  such	  rhetorical	  force	  within	  liberal	  political	  culture,	  
and	  assesses	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  alignment	  of	  law	  and	  belonging	  on	  the	  politics	  
of	  religious	  diversity.	  
	  
Submitting	  to	  law	  and	  civic	  identity	  in	  Canada	  
	  
	   Issues	  of	  national	  identity	  in	  Canada	  have	  been	  tethered	  to	  questions	  
of	   religious	  belonging	   and	   law	   since	   the	   formal	   origins	   of	   the	   country	  with	  
the	  Treaty	  of	  Paris,	   1763,	  which	   recognized	   that	   the	   country’s	   political	   and	  
legal	   character	  would	   be	   defined	   by	   the	   co-­‐existence	   of	   English	   Protestant	  
and	  French	  Catholic	  communities.	  	  With	  its	  foundations	  in	  the	  constitutional	  
protection	  of	  French	  Catholic	  and	  English	  Protestant	  schooling,	  and	  moving	  
through	   a	   history	   of	   religious	   diversification	   and,	   in	   the	   1970s,	   the	   official	  
adoption	   of	   a	   policy	   of	   multiculturalism,	   the	   Canadian	   experience	   of	   the	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interaction	   of	   religious	   difference,	   politics,	   and	   law	   is	   distinctive	   and	   rich.	  	  
The	  state’s	  troubled	  historical	  engagement	  with	  Aboriginal	  communities	  and	  
the	   need	   to	   reckon	   with	   the	   contemporary	   constitutional	   protection	   of	  
Aboriginal	   rights	   in	   s.	   35	   of	   the	   Constitution	   Act,	   1982	   and	   the	   continued	  
salience	  of	  Aboriginal	   legal	   traditions	  has	  drawn	  out	   further	  dimensions	  of	  
this	   complex	   imbrication	   of	   law,	   sovereignty,	   cultural	   worldview,	   and	  
community	   belonging.	   	   The	   “complicated	   emotional	   inheritances”	   (Asad,	  
2006:	   102)	   produced	   by	   this	   local	   history	   has	   meant	   that	   secularism	   has	  
taken	   unique	   shape	   in	   Canada	   –	   eschewing	   strict	   non-­‐establishment	   and	  
formal	   laïcité	   while	   recognizing	   constitutional	   protections	   for	   religious	  
freedom	   –	   and	   that	   the	   lines	   between	   law	   and	   community	   belonging	   have	  
been	  particularly	  live	  and	  salient.	  	  	  
Within	   that	   frame,	   contemporary	   debates	   about	   religious	   difference	  
and	   secularism	   have	   focussed	   on	   questions	   surrounding	   a	   range	   of	   issues	  
including	   gender	   equality,	   state	   education,	   sexual	   orientation,	   religious	  
accommodation,	   and	   public	   religious	   symbols,	   and	   have	   involved	   many	  
religious	   and	   cultural	   communities.	   	   Yet,	   as	   in	   other	   Western	   liberal	  
democracies,	  the	  Muslim	  community	  in	  Canada	  has	  occupied	  a	  central	  role	  in	  
the	  modern	  politics	  of	  religious	  difference,	   in	  debates	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  
secularism,	   and	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   boundaries	   of	   political	   belonging.1	  	  
For	   this	   reason,	   despite	   a	   fascinating	   range	   of	   historical	   and	   contemporary	  
cases	   that	   raise	   issues	   of	   the	   interaction	   of	   law,	   politics,	   and	   religion,	   this	  
paper	  focuses	  on	  two	  high	  profile	  and	  recent	  controversies	  involving	  Muslim	  
communities	  in	  Canada.	  	  
	  
The	  ‘sharia	  law	  debate’	  
	  
	   The	   symbolic	   role	   of	   state	   law	   came	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   Canadian	  
debates	   about	   religious	   diversity	   through	   the	   much-­‐publicized	   “sharia	   law	  
debate.”	  	  This	  political	  and	  legal	  controversy	  arose	  in	  the	  Province	  of	  Ontario	  
in	   the	   late	   fall	   of	   2003	  when	  an	  organization	   called	   the	   Islamic	   Institute	   of	  
Civil	  Justice	  proposed	  the	  use	  of	  arbitration	  tribunals	  that	  would	  resolve	  civil	  
matters,	   particularly	   family	   law	   and	   inheritance	   disputes,	   through	   the	  
application	  of	  Islamic	  law.	  (Bakht,	  2004)	  	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  Ontario	  
Arbitration	  Act	  had	  allowed	  for	  the	  private	  arbitration	  of	  civil	  disputes	  using	  
agreed-­‐upon	  principles	  or	  systems	  of	   law.	   (Boyd,	  2004)	   	  Although	  religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On the role of Islam in shaping contemporary conceptions of, debates about, and politics 
surrounding secularism see, for example, Asad (2003), Scott (2007), Hurd (2008), and Modood 
(2012). 
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arbitration,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   Jewish	   beis	   din	   and	   among	   some	   Christian	   and	  
Ismaili	  groups,	  had	  been	  taking	  place	  for	  many	  years	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  
legal	   framework,	   this	  proposal	   from	   the	   IICJ	   created	  something	  of	   a	   “moral	  
panic”	   (Razak,	   2007:	   7)	   that	   became	   the	   focal	   point	   for	   debates	   about	   the	  
boundaries	   of	   religious	   freedom	   in	   Canadian	   society.	   	   Substantial	   concern	  
was	  voiced	  by	   feminist	  organizations,	  who	  argued	   that	   the	  use	  of	   Sharia	   in	  
settling	   family	   disputes	  would	   have	   particular	   and	   particularly	   devastating	  
effect	   on	   women.	   	   The	   Canadian	   Council	   of	   Muslim	  Women,	   the	  Women’s	  
Legal	  Education	  and	  Action	  Fund	   (L.E.A.F.),	   the	  National	  Council	  of	  Women	  
and	   the	   Law	   (N.A.W.L.)	   and	   a	   number	   of	   other	   organizations	   expressed	  
powerful	   critiques	   of	   the	   use	   of	   religious	   law	   to	   settle	   civil	   disputes.	   	   The	  
media	   fed	   a	   general	   alarm,	   with	   one	   newspaper	   declaring	   “Muslim	  
barbarians	   [were]	  knocking	  on	   the	  gates	  of	  Ontario”.	   (Bakht,	  2006:	  70)	   	  As	  
Razak	   recounts,	   newspapers	   warned	   Canadians	   that,	   with	   this	   proposal,	  
“they	  were	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  their	  own	  fateful	  encounter	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  
West,	   a	   swift	   descent	   from	   the	   ideals	   of	   the	   British	   Empire	   to	   a	   barbaric	  
multicultural	  present”.	  (Razak,	  2007:	  9)2	  
	   Subject	  to	  this	  substantial	  public	  pressure,	  the	  Government	  of	  Ontario	  
commissioned	  a	   report	   into	   the	  use	  of	  private	   arbitration	   to	   resolve	   family	  
law	  disputes,	  to	  be	  written	  by	  former	  Attorney	  General	  of	  the	  Province,	  and	  
feminist	   activist,	   Marion	   Boyd.	   	   A	   number	   of	   proposals	   circulated	   in	   the	  
public	   debate.	   	   Although	   the	   controversy	   had	   been	   inaugurated	   by	   the	  
prospect	   of	   Islamic	   arbitration,	   and	   although	   much	   of	   the	   rhetoric	   was	  
directed	  at	  Muslim	  communities	  in	  Canada,	  the	  political	  and	  legal	  difficulties	  
associated	  with	  singling	  out	  Sharia	  led	  to	  many	  suggesting	  that	  all	  faith-­‐based	  
arbitration	   in	   family	   law	  matters	   should	   be	   banned.	   	   Others	   went	   further,	  
suggesting	  that	  private	  arbitration	  of	  all	  forms	  should	  be	  prohibited	  in	  family	  
law	  matters,	  as	  it	  was	  in	  Quebec.	  	  After	  study	  and	  consultation,	  Boyd’s	  report	  
recommended	  that,	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  certain	  new	  oversight	  measures	  and	  
education	   initiatives,	   religious	   arbitration	   continue	   to	   be	   permitted	   in	  
Ontario.	   (Boyd,	   2004)	   	   Initially	   the	   government	   appeared	   to	   endorse	   this	  
conclusion,	   declining	   to	   act	   against	   Islamic	   arbitration.	   	   After	   sustained	  
public	  furore,	  however,	  the	  Government	  reversed	  course.	  	  On	  September	  11,	  
2005,	   the	   Ontario	   Government	   announced	   that	   it	   would	   ensure	   that	   there	  
was	   “one	   law	   for	   all”,	   ultimately	   introducing	   The	   Family	   Statue	   Law	  
Amendment	   Act,	   2006.	   	   This	   legislation	   purported	   to	   ban	   all	   faith-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an extensive study of the media coverage in Canada surrounding the “Sharia Debate”, with 
particular attention to the representation of Muslim women’s agency, see Anna Korteweg’s article 
on this episode in the Canadian politics of religious difference (Korteweg, 2008).  
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arbitration	   by	   establishing	   that	   all	   family	   law	   arbitrations	   in	   the	   province	  
would	   be	   “conducted	   exclusively	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   law	   of	   Ontario	   or	  
another	  Canadian	  jurisdiction.”3	  
	   Sherene	  Razak	  has	  explored	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Sharia	  
debate”	  rehearsed	  the	  “eternal	  triangle	  of	  the	  imperilled	  Muslim	  woman,	  the	  
dangerous	  Muslim	  man	  and	  the	  civilized	  European”.	  (Razak,	  2007:	  5)	  	  Others	  
have	  shown	  the	  way	  in	  which,	  despite	  legitimate	  concerns	  about	  the	  negative	  
impacts	   of	   traditional	   religious	   law	  on	  women,	   feminist	   resistance	   to	   faith-­‐
based	   arbitration	   often	   depended	   on	   the	   opposition	   of	   religion	   and	   choice,	  
framing	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   religious	  woman	   in	   an	   uncomfortably	   categorical	  
position	  of	  disempowerment	  or	  even	  definitional	  self-­‐estrangement.	  (Bakht,	  
2006;	   Razak,	   2007)	   	   As	   Anna	   Korteweg	   argues,	   rather	   than	   examining	   the	  
relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  agency,	  the	  public	  discourse	  on	  this	  issue	  
“questioned	  Muslim	   immigrant	  women’s	   capacity	   to	   act	   in	   a	   self-­‐interested	  
way.”	  (Korteweg,	  2008:	  437)	  	  The	  “Sharia	  debate”	  holds	  out	  much	  of	  interest	  
in	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   interactions	   of	   law,	   religion,	   politics,	   and	   gender.4	  	   Of	  
particular	   interest	   to	   this	   paper	   is	   the	   symbolic	   role	   played	   by	   law	   in	   this	  
instance	   of	   the	  management	   of	   religious	  difference	   and	   the	   construction	   of	  
civic	  identity.	  	  	  
	   Prior	  to	  these	  amendments,	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  private	  arbitration	  
was	  one	   in	  which	  multiple	  normative	  orders	  were	   recognized	  and	  afforded	  
space.	   	   When	   this	   formal	   pluralism	   was	   met	   with	   deep	   anxieties	   about	  
religious	   and	   cultural	   diversity	   the	   law	   took	   on	   a	   role	   as	   the	   overriding	  
marker	  for	  community	  identity.	  	  Membership	  in	  the	  demos	  was	  to	  be	  marked	  
by	   the	   law	   to	   which	   we	   all	   belong.	   	   This	   role	   for	   state	   law	   involved	   two	  
moves:	   Islamic	   (ultimately,	   all	   religious)	   law	   was	   denatured	   as	   “law,”	  
precluded	   from	   the	   order	   of	   publicly	   salient	   norms,	   while	   a	   simultaneous	  
claim	  was	  made	   that	   legal	   belonging	   is	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	   the	   political	  
community.	  	  Premier	  McGuinty	  claimed	  that	  to	  allow	  faith-­‐based	  arbitration	  
would	   “threaten	   our	   common	   ground”	   (Bakht,	   2006:	   80)	   as	   a	   political	  
community;	   this	   common	   ground	  would	   be	   secured	   by	   confirming	   that	   all	  
would	  have	  to	  conform	  to	  secular	  law.	  	  	  Subject	  to	  this	  symbolic	  role	  for	  law,	  
the	  normative	  aspect	  of	  religion	  is	  flattened,	  suppressed,	  in	  favor	  of	  state	  law,	  
which	   takes	   on	   special	   salience	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   belonging	   in	   political	  
community.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This limitation was inserted into both the Arbitration Act, 1992, s. 2.2, and the Family Law Act, s. 
59.2. 
4 Anna Korteweg and Jennifer Selby’s edited volume on Islam, Sharia, and family arbitration 
offers a wonderful exploration of these dimensions of the issue (Korteweg and Selby, 2012).   
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   Religious	  legal	  orders	  are	  not	  actually	  extinguished	  by	  such	  a	  move,	  of	  
course,	  nor	  is	  state	  law	  able	  to	  occupy	  the	  entire	  field	  of	  the	  normative	  in	  the	  
lives	   of	   the	   governed.	   	   Religious	   law	   persists	   as	   a	   social	   fact.	   	   Indeed,	   the	  
amendments	  brought	   about	  by	   the	  Sharia	  debate	  did	  not	  prohibit	   religious	  
arbitration.	  (Bakht,	  2006)	  Individuals	  could	  continue	  to	  resolve	  issues	  based	  
on	  whatever	   law	  they	  saw	  fit;	   the	  most	   that	   the	   legislation	  could	  do	  was	   to	  
simply	  deny	  state-­‐backing	  –	  the	  enforcing	  power	  of	  the	  state	  –	  to	  agreements	  
reached	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  faith-­‐based	  arbitration.	  	  Yet	  what	  persists	  as	  a	  social	  
fact	   is	   denied	   public	   salience	   as	   part	   of	   the	   normative	   world.	   	   That	  
suppression	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  “jurispathic”	  move,	  the	  pluralism	  repressing	  
aspect	   of	   state	   law	   that	   Cover	   identified	   so	   well	   as	   a	   feature	   of	   the	  
adjudicative	  moment	  (Cover,	  1983).	  	  At	  these	  jurispathic	  points,	  other	  nomoi	  
suffer	  a	  public	  death,	  not	  an	  extinguishment.	  	  
	   Razak	  argues	  that	  those	  who	  intervened	  publicly	  to	  condemn	  the	  use	  
of	   faith-­‐based	   arbitration	   did	   so	   in	   a	   way	   that	   tended	   to	   underwrite	   the	  
modern/premodern	  divide	  between	  secularism	  and	  religion,	  another	  way	  of	  
defining	  the	  boundaries	  of	  community.	  	  But	  the	  law	  played	  a	  crucial	  symbolic	  
role	   in	  even	  this	  potent	  distinction:	   to	  belong	  to	  the	  modern	   is	   to	  belong	  to	  
secular	   law,	   not	   to	   religion	   or	   a	   religious	   normative	   order.	   	   In	   a	   turn	   of	  
notable	  philosophic	  and	  political	  irony,	  this	  symbolism	  operated	  by	  aligning	  
freedom	   with	   law.	   	   Divergent	   models	   of	   Muslim	   women’s	   agency	   were	   at	  
stake	   in	   the	   debates	   surrounding	   Sharia	   in	   Ontario;	   as	   Korteweg	  
demonstrates,	   the	   dominant	  model	   framed	  women’s	   agency	   “as	   contingent	  
upon…	   resistance	   to	   Islam”	   rather	   than	   “as	   embedded	   in	   religious	   (and	  
other)	   contexts.”	   	   (Korteweg,	   2008:	   435)	   	   With	   (premodern)	   religion	   as	   a	  
constraint	  on	  agency,	  state	  law	  would	  be	  the	  means	  of	  securing	  freedom	  for	  
religious	   women.	   	   Rather	   than	   one	   of	   the	   contexts,	   alongside	   religion,	   in	  
which	  agency	  is	  embedded,	  law	  is	  the	  condition	  for	  freedom.	  	  Submission	  to	  
law	  will	  make	  you	   free	   (and	  modern).	   	  Of	   course,	   the	  boundaries	  set	  up	  by	  
this	  demand	  for	  collective	  submission	  to	  state	  law	  are	  not	  just	  these	  kinds	  of	  
grand	   epochal	   and	   philosophical	   distinctions	   –	   they	   are	  more	   political	   and	  
local.	   	   Law	   is	   marking	   a	   specific	   community,	   is	   standing	   in	   for	   that	  
community’s	   identity,	   and	   serving	   as	   that	   which	   binds	   the	   community	  
together.	  	  It	  is	  not	  just	  “one	  law	  for	  all”,	  it	  is	  “one	  law	  for	  all	  of	  us”.	  	  In	  this,	  the	  
imaginative	   role	   of	   law	   in	   this	   configuration	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   civic	  
enculturation	  is	  manifest.	  	  This	  is	  the	  logic	  and	  political	  dynamic	  engendered	  
by	  the	  alignment	  of	  law	  and	  belonging.	  	  To	  be	  part	  of	  the	  community	  requires	  
submission	   to	   the	   law.	   	   One	   becomes	   a	   normative	   citizen	   by	   showing	  
obedience	  to	  the	  law.	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The	  niqab	  and	  identity	  through	  law	  
	  
	   The	   veiled	   Muslim	   woman	   has	   been,	   ironically,	   the	   focal	   point	   for	  
much	  debate	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   secular	   state	   and	   the	  management	   of	  
religious	   difference.	   	   Perhaps	   best	   known	   has	   been	   the	   debate	   in	   France	  
following	  the	  Stasi	  Commission	  of	  2003,	  culminating	  in	  a	  law	  that	  prohibited	  
“conspicuous	   religious	   symbols”	   in	  public	   schools.	   	  Much	   analytic	   attention	  
was	  given	  to	  this	  “Islamic	  Veil	  Affair”	  as	  an	  example	  not	  only	  of	  the	  distinctive	  
French	  form	  of	  secularism,	  laïcité,	  but	  of	  the	  European	  hostility	  toward	  Islam.	  	  
For	  Talal	  Asad,	  this	  debate	  in	  France	  was	  an	  example	  of	  the	  state	  engaged	  in	  
symbolic	  work,	  exercising	   its	  authority	   to	  define	   the	  meaning	  of	  a	   sign	  and	  
then	  to	  consolidate	  its	  authority	  in	  reaction	  to	  these	  meanings.	  	  (Asad,	  2006)	  	  
Asad	   notes	   that	   it	   was	   not,	   ultimately,	   the	   veil	   itself	   that	   provoked	   state	  
concern;	   rather,	   it	  was	   the	   act	   of	   displaying	   the	   veil,	   the	  will	  to	  display	   the	  
symbol,	  that	  troubled	  the	  secular	  society.	  	  (Asad,	  2006:	  97)	  	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  
threatening	  significance	  of	  the	  religious	  symbol	  inheres	  in	  its	  reflection	  of	  a	  
desire	   to	   assert	   particular	   identity,	   religious	   identity,	   in	   a	   manner	  
inconsistent	  with	   the	   universal	   character	   of	   republican	   legal	   identity.5	  	   The	  
force	   of	   religious	   belonging	   is	   politically	   constructed	   as	   a	   constraint	   on	   or	  
distortion	  of	  autonomy,	  the	  remedy	  to	  which	  is,	  paradoxically,	  to	  be	  found	  in	  
yielding	   to	   the	   liberal	   republican	   state.	   	   The	   symbolic	   work	   of	   the	   state	   is	  
carried	  out	   in	  cultivation	  of	  “particular	  sensibilities	  essential	   to	  a	  particular	  
kind	   of	   contradictory	   individual	   –	   one	   who	   is	   morally	   sovereign	   and	   yet	  
obedient	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  secular	  republic,	  flexible	  and	  tolerant	  yet	  fiercely	  
principled.”	  (Asad,	  2006:	  104)	  
	   The	   niqab	   has	   similarly	   moved	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   public	   debate	  
surrounding	  religious	  difference	  and	  civic	  identity	  in	  Canada.	   	  In	  early	  2010	  
the	   Liberal	   Government	   of	   Quebec	   tabled	   Bill	   94,	   which	   would	   prohibit	  
anyone	   employed	   by	   the	   government	   to	   deliver	   a	   service	   and	   anyone	  
accessing	  government	  services	  from	  doing	  so	  while	  wearing	  a	  face	  covering.	  	  
This	  legislation	  was	  introduced	  following	  a	  pitched	  debate	  that	  arose	  after	  a	  
niqab-­‐wearing	  woman	  was	   expelled	   from	   French	   language	   classes	   because	  
she	  refused	  to	  remove	  her	  face	  covering.	  	  As	  it	  was	  in	  France,	  this	  legal	  move	  
was	  tethered	  to	  a	  conception	  of	  secularism,	  Premier	  Charest	  explaining	  that	  
the	  Bill	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  Quebec’s	  commitment	  to	  “open	  secularism”.	  	  	  With	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John Bowen importantly shows that despite the political and rhetorical force of this public ideal 
of all citizens interacting with a French republican identity, unmediated by other associational 
allegiances, a rich associational life in fact subsists beneath this politics of common public identity 
(Bowen, 2010). 
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this	   phrase	   Premier	   Charest	  was	   invoking	   a	   concept	   advocated	   by	   Charles	  
Taylor	   and	   Gérard	   Bouchard	   in	   Quebec’s	   own	   public	   commission	   into	  
religious	  difference,	  the	  Bouchard-­‐Taylor	  commission.	  (Bouchard	  and	  Taylor,	  
2008)	   	  But	  Bill	   94	  was	   also	   represented	   to	   the	  public	   as	   an	   emblem	  of	   the	  
demands	  associated	  with	  civic	  enculturation,	  a	  rather	  narrow	  legal	  measure	  
with	  grand	  symbolic	  aspiration,	  standing	  compendiously	  for	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  
be	   part	   of	   Quebec	   society.	   	   Quebec	   Immigration	   Minister	   Yolande	   James	  
explained	   what	   lay	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Bill:	   “If	   you	   want	   to	   integrate	   into	  
Quebec	  Society,	  here	  are	  our	  values.	   	  We	  want	  to	  see	  your	  face.”	  (Hamilton,	  
2010)	   	   This	   story	   continued	  when,	   in	   2013,	   the	   governing	   Parti	   Quebecois	  
proposed	  a	  “Charter	  of	  Quebec	  Values,”	  the	  most	  contentious	  aspect	  of	  which	  
was	  to	  prohibit,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  secularism,	  those	  serving	  in	  public	  roles	  from	  
wearing	  conspicuous	  religious	  symbols.6	  	  Although	  the	  ban	  would	  capture	  all	  
religious	  symbols,	   including	  kippahs	  and	   turbans,	   the	  niqab	  and	  hijab	  were	  
very	  much	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  contemplation.	  	  	  
	   This	   link	   between	   the	   issue	   of	   wearing	   the	   niqab	   and	   questions	   of	  
civic	   identity	   was	   made	   explicit	   when,	   in	   2011,	   then	   Federal	   Minister	   of	  
Citizenship	   and	   Immigration,	   Jason	   Kenney,	   announced	   that	  women	  would	  
not	   be	   permitted	   to	   wear	   the	   niqab	   while	   taking	   the	   oath	   at	   citizenship	  
ceremonies.	  	  According	  to	  Minister	  Kenney,	  “[a]llowing	  a	  group	  to	  hide	  their	  
faces	   while	   they	   are	   becoming	   members	   of	   our	   community	   is	   counter	   to	  
Canada’s	   commitment	   to	  openness,	   equality	  and	  social	   cohesion.”	   (National	  
Post,	  2011)	  Although	  it	  seemed	  that	  no	  formal	  steps	  were	  routinely	  taken	  at	  
immigration	  ceremonies	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  new	  citizens	  were	  actually	  saying	  
the	  oath,	   the	  display	  of	  one’s	   face	  nevertheless	   took	  on	  particular	   symbolic	  
import	   aligned	  with	   inclusion	   in	   the	  national	   community.	   	   Indeed,	  Minister	  
Kenney	  would	   later	   explain	   that,	   apart	   from	   any	   difficulty	   in	   verifying	   that	  
individuals	   were	   actually	   saying	   the	   oath,	   his	   concern	   was	   the	   public	   and	  
legal	   nature	   of	   the	   activity:	   “It’s	   a	   public	   licensing,	   a	   declaration	   of	   your	  
membership	   in	   the	   community	   and	   you	   do	   that	   in	   front	   of	   your	   fellow	  
citizens	   in	   public.	   	   To	   obscure	   yourself	   at	   that	   essentially	   public	   moment	  
when	   you’re	   making	   a	   legal	   undertaking	   in	   front	   of	   your	   fellow	   citizens	  
undermines	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   public	   oath.”	   (Globe	   and	   Mail,	   2012)	   	   The	  
immigration	   ceremony	   is	   the	   most	   literal	   moment	   of	   citizen	   formation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Parti Québecois sought to put this proposed bill (Bill 60) at the heart of a provincial election 
called for the spring of 2014.  The election turned out to focus, instead, on economic issues and 
questions of provincial sovereignty.  The PQ were soundly defeated in the election, held on April 
7, placing Bill 60 on the political backburner, for the time being.  For discussion of Bill 60 see the 
backgrounder and collection of comments on The Immanent Frame: 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/02/20/the-charter-of-quebec-values/.  
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through	  law	  –	  it	  is	  the	  formal	  acceptance	  of	  a	  new	  civic	  identity,	  of	  belonging	  
to	  a	  new	  political	  community.	  	  Among	  the	  many	  manifestations	  of	  difference	  
tolerated	  at	  that	  moment,	  wearing	  the	  niqab	  could	  not	  be	  one.	   	  This	  symbol	  
was	   simply	   too	   saturated	   with	   the	   will	   to	   manifest	   a	   different	   identity,	   a	  
symbol	  felt	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  belonging	  to	  the	  secular	  state.	  	  	  	  
In	   the	   courts,	   the	   most	   recent	   development	   in	   the	   controversies	  
surrounding	  the	  niqab	  is	  the	  case	  of	  R.	  v.	  N.S..	   	  N.S.	  was	  the	  complainant	  in	  a	  
case	   involving	   allegations	   of	   repeated	   sexual	   assault	   by	   her	   uncle	   and	   her	  
cousin	   while	   she	   was	   a	   child.	   	   She	   wore	   a	   niqab.	   	   During	   the	   preliminary	  
inquiry	   the	  accused	  sought	  an	  order	   that	  would	  require	  N.S.	   to	   remove	  her	  
niqab	  when	  she	   testified.	   	  The	  accused’s	  principal	  argument	  was	   that	  N.S.’s	  
niqab	   denied	   the	   accused	   proper	   cross-­‐examination	   of	   the	   complainant,	  
interfered	   with	   the	   assessment	   of	   her	   credibility,	   and	   thereby	   eroded	   the	  
ability	   of	   the	   accused	   to	   make	   full	   answer	   and	   defence.	   	   The	   Crown	   and,	  
ultimately,	   counsel	   for	   N.S.	   strongly	   objected,	   citing	   her	   Charter	   rights	   to	  
religious	  freedom	  as	  a	  shield	  against	  such	  an	  order.	  	  The	  preliminary	  inquiry	  
judge	  balanced	  the	  right	  of	  the	  accused	  to	  full	  answer	  and	  defence	  against	  the	  
complainant’s	  religious	  practices,	  ultimately	  ordering	  her	  to	  remove	  the	  face	  
covering.	  	  N.S.	  moved	  to	  quash	  this	  order	  and	  the	  issue	  moved	  up	  through	  the	  
system	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and,	  ultimately,	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
of	  Canada,	  where	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  proper	  approach	  was,	  
indeed,	  to	  balance	  the	  competing	  rights	  at	  issue,	  but	  sent	  the	  matter	  back	  to	  
be	   reconsidered	   in	   light	   of	   the	   Court’s	   guidance.	   	   On	   re-­‐examination,	   the	  
preliminary	   inquiry	   judge	   again	   ordered	   that	   N.S.	   remove	   her	   niqab.	   	   The	  
case	  engendered	  pitched	  public	  debate	  about	  the	  limits	  of	  religious	  diversity	  
and	   the	   legitimate	   demands	   that	   the	   state	   can	   place	   upon	   its	   citizens	  
irrespective	  or	  in	  spite	  of	  religious	  difference.	  	  	  
All	  of	  these	  Canadian	  controversies	  are	  instances	  in	  which,	  faced	  with	  
deep	   normative	   difference,	   obedience	   to	   the	   law	   came	   to	   serve	   as	   a	  
diagnostic	  for	  civic	  inclusion.	  	  Bill	  94	  and	  the	  proposed	  Charter	  would	  create	  
a	   legal	   rule,	   obedience	   to	  which	   is	   a	   condition	   of	   full	   inclusion	   in	  Quebec’s	  
society.	   	   The	   citizenship	   ceremony	   is	   an	   explicit	   act	   of	   submission	   to	  
sovereignty	  and,	  under	  Minister	  Kenney’s	  rules,	  demands	  divestment	  of	  this	  
expression	  of	  religious	  identity.	  	  But	  I	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  final	  example,	  the	  
issue	  of	  testifying	  with	  the	  niqab,	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  use	  of	  this	  move	  in	  
the	  repertoire	  of	  secularism	  –	  the	  claim	  that	  in	  a	  secular	  state,	  one	  must	  first	  
belong	  to	  law.	  	  	  
Law	  is	  not	  just	  a	  regime	  of	  substantive	  rules,	  it	  is	  a	  world	  of	  procedure	  
and	   performance;	   to	   draw	   from	   Seligman,	   et	   al.,	   law	   is	   a	   form	   of	   ritual,	   a	  
subjunctive	   activity	   that	   creates	   a	   shared	   social	  world	   around	   an	   imagined	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“as	   if”.	   (Seligman	   et	   al.,	   2008)	   	   The	   courtroom	   holds	   a	   special	   place	   in	   the	  
symbolic	   architecture	   of	   the	   modern	   rule	   of	   law.	   	   The	   mythology	   of	   the	  
courtroom	  holds	   that	   it	   is	   the	  place	   in	  which	   truth	   is	   discerned,	  where	   the	  
claims	  of	   state	  power	  are	   tested	  against	   the	  higher	  authority	  of	   law,	  where	  
disputes	  between	  individuals	  are	  settled	  by	  resort	  to	  the	  immanent	  justice	  of	  
the	  law.	   	  Paul	  Kahn	  has	  argued	  that	  in	  a	  constitutional	  democracy	  the	  judge	  
acts	   as	   the	   high	   priest	   of	   the	   law,	   mediating	   between	   the	   interests	   before	  
them	  and	  the	  law	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  higher	  will,	  of	  the	  constituent	  power	  of	  
the	   demos.	   (Kahn,	   2004)	   The	   courtroom	   is	   like	   the	   Delphic	   oracle	   of	   the	  
modern	  secular	  state.	   	  And	  like	  the	  oracle	  at	  Delphi,	  one	  cannot	  disentangle	  
the	   forms	   and	   rituals	   of	   engagement	   from	   the	   substantive	   ends	   of	   the	  
courtroom.	   	   The	   courtroom	   is	   one	   important	   site	   for	   the	   performance	   of	  
commitment	   to	   the	   law.	   	  This	   is	  not	  merely	   to	   indulge	  a	  rhetorical	   flourish.	  	  
The	   symbolic	   paraphernalia	   of	   the	   court,	   from	   the	   formalities	   of	   dress	   and	  
address	   to	   the	   architecture	   of	   the	   room,	   impress	   themselves	   upon	   the	  
unfamiliar	  as	  overtly	  ritualistic	  –	  even	  church-­‐like	  –	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  trial	  has	  
important	  functional	  ends,	  not	  least	  of	  which	  is	  the	  attempt	  to	  arrive	  at	  truth.	  	  
But	   to	  participate	   in	  a	   trial	   is	  also	  to	   take	  part	   in	  a	  ritual	   that	  sanctifies	   the	  
authority	  of	   law	  as	   the	  expression	  of	   the	  will	  and	  values	  of	   the	  community.	  	  
As	  one	  of	   the	  sets	  of	   reasons	   in	   the	  N.S.	  case	  put	   it,	   the	  courts	  and	   the	   trial	  
process	  are	  understood	  as	  central	  to	  “the	  complex	  web	  of	  institutions,	  rules	  
and	  values	  embraced	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  of	  a	  state	  and	  a	  society	  
living	  under	  and	  within	  the	  law.”	  (para.	  74)7	  
Cast	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  debate	  about	  wearing	  the	  niqab	  while	  testifying	  
says	   something	   important	   about	   the	   symbolic	   function	   of	   law	   in	   the	  
management	  of	  religious	  diversity.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  is	  a	  pragmatic	  balancing	  
taking	   place	   here.	   The	   loss	   of	   the	   opportunity	   to	   observe	   the	   face	   of	   the	  
witness	   is	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  conventional	  structure	  and	  assumed	  virtues	  
of	   cross-­‐examination.8	  	  The	  witness	  also	  has	  privacy	  and	  equality	   concerns,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Unlike Chief Justice McLachlin’s majority reasons, which emphasized the need for a case-by-
case balancing, Justice LeBel (Rothstein J concurring) would have held that the nature of the trial 
process and open courts dictate that a witness should never be permitted to wear a niqab while 
testifying.  The difference in reasoning might be misleading, however.  Given the details of the 
guidance given the majority on how to conduct this balancing, it seems clear that whenever the 
witness is offering important information on a contested point, the practical outcome will be the 
same as Justice LeBel’s.  For a discussion and critique of the legal analysis reflected in the 
majority decision, see Moon (2014: 101-105). 
8 Whether demeanor evidence is as reliable as is tacitly assumed in the conventions of trial 
procedure and the law of evidence is a crucial empirical point.  In N.S., the Court felt that it had 
not been given enough social science evidence to disturb these structural and historical 
assumptions.  For discussions of the value and use of demeanor evidence in criminal trials, see 
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particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  alleged	  sexual	  assaults.	   	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Canada’s	  majority	  judgment	  focussed	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  balancing	  and	  how	  
to	   approach	   it	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis.	   	   But	   the	   debate	   is	   also	   about	   the	  
ultimate	   authority	   of	   legal	   ways	   and	   practices	   prevailing	   over	   alternative	  
claims	  of	  authoritative	  belonging.	  	  The	  demands	  of	  obedience	  to	  legal	  process	  
are	   as	  potent	   as	   the	   claim	   for	  obedience	   to	   substantive	   law.	   	  Whatever	   the	  
pragmatic	  imperatives	  involved,	  if	  N.S.	  is	  ultimately	  told	  to	  remove	  her	  niqab,	  
she	  is	  told	  that	  her	  participation	  in	  the	  collective	  project	  of	  law	  requires,	  first,	  
that	  she	  submit	  to	  the	  ritual	  forms	  of	  law.	  	  Justice	  Abella	  was	  most	  sensitive	  
to	  this	  point	  in	  her	  dissenting	  reasons,	  explaining	  that	  to	  require	  a	  witness	  to	  
remove	   the	   niqab	   was	   tantamount	   to	   asking	   her	   “to	   choose	   between	   her	  
religious	   beliefs	   and	   her	   ability	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   justice	   system.”	   (para.	  
94)9	  	   She	   must	   submit	   to	   legal	   process	   in	   order	   to	   belong	   to	   the	   justice-­‐
seeking	  community.	  	  	  
The	   niqab	   debates	   also	   reveal	   a	   facet	   of	   the	   internal	   machinery	   by	  
which	  law	  secures	  its	  authority.	  	  Scholarly,	  juridical,	  and	  public	  debate	  often	  
appeals	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  niqab	   is	   not	   really	   “religious”	   in	   character	  but,	  
instead,	  cultural.	   	   In	   this	   characterization	  one	  should	  hear	  again	   the	  ring	  of	  
Cover’s	   concept	   of	   the	   “jurispathic”	   (Cover,	   1983).	   	   As	   Cover	   explained	   so	  
well,	   in	   a	   pluralistic	   world	   the	   central	   challenge	   of	   adjudication	   is	   not	   the	  
absence	   of	   law	   or	   even	   unclear	   law	   but,	   instead,	   too	   much	   law.	   	   In	   the	  
adjudicative	   effort	   to	   thin	   this	   normative	   garden,	   assigning	   a	   norm	   to	   the	  
realm	  of	  culture	  rather	  than	  religious	  imperative	  is	  one	  way	  to	  deny	  it	  a	  law-­‐
like	   character.	   	   If	   a	   practice	   is	   required,	   commanded	   by	   religion,	   the	  
competition	  of	  normative	  systems	  is	  much	  more	  fraught	  and	  visible.	  	  If	  what	  
we	   have	   on	   our	   hands	   is	   not	   normative	   competition	   but,	   instead,	   law	  
encountering	  “mere	  culture”,	   the	  violence	  of	  state	   law	  is,	   itself,	  veiled.	   	  This	  
dubious	  sorting	  into	  “command”	  or	  “culture”	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  denaturing	  
of	   religious	   law,	   a	   technique	  by	  which	   secular	   culture	   elides	   the	  normative	  
messiness	  of	  religious	  diversity.	  
The	  preliminary	  inquiry	  judge	  in	  the	  N.S.	  case,	  who	  first	  ruled	  on	  the	  
issue,	   unwittingly	   offered	   an	   evocative	   signal	   of	   the	   role	   of	   submission	   to	  
legal	  ritual	   in	  the	  definition	  of	  civic	   identity.	   	   In	  deciding	  that	  N.S.	  would	  be	  
ordered	   to	   remove	   her	   niqab,	   the	   judge	   observed	   that	   she	   was	   willing	   to	  
uncover	  her	  face	  when	  she	  participated	  in	  the	  hajj,	   the	  pilgrimage	  to	  Mecca	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bakht (2012) and Laird (2014).  Among the works of social science casting doubt on the reliability 
of demeanor evidence is Ekman and Sullivan (1991). 
9 Justice Abella would have preferred a general rule allowing the niqab unless the witness’ face 
was somehow directly relevant to the trial.   
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that	  is	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  Islam.	  	  To	  the	  judge,	  this	  was	  evidence	  that	  her	  felt	  
obligation	  to	  wear	  the	  niqab	  was	  mutable	  should	  circumstances	  warrant.	  	  But	  
the	   unspoken	   analogy	   is	   poignant.	   	   The	   hajj	   is	   a	   ritual	   performance	   of	  
submission	  to	  God	  and	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  community	  within	  Islam.	  	  The	  tacit	  
equivalency	   drawn	   by	   the	   judge	   betrays	   the	   symbolic	   significance	   of	  
participation	   in	  the	  rituals	  of	   law.	   	  The	   implied	  assertion	   is	   that	   the	  court	  –	  
the	   law	   –	   should	   occupy	   a	   similarly	   sacred	   position	   in	   the	   life	   of	   the	  
normative	   subject.	   	   Through	   adherence	   to	   legal	   ritual	   one	   affirms	   the	  
sovereignty	   of	   law	   and,	   with	   this,	   one’s	   belonging	   to	   the	   civic	   community,	  
which	   is	   as	  much	   constituted	   by	   the	   ties	   of	   law	   (Latour,	   2010)	   as	   it	   is	   the	  
author	  of	  law.	  	  
	   In	   his	   examination	   of	   the	   “Islamic	   veil	   affair”	   in	   France,	   Asad	  
comes	   to	   an	   illuminating	   conclusion	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   French	  
secularism.	  	  Laïcité,	  Asad	  explains,	  	  
is	   a	   continuous	   attempt	   by	   the	   state	   apparatuses	   at	  
encouraging	   subjects	   to	   make	   and	   recognize	   themselves	  
through	   appropriate	   signs	   as	   properly	   secularsized	   citizens	  
who	   ‘know	   that	   they	   belong	   to	   France’.	   	   (Only	   to	   France?	  
Ultimately	   to	  France?	  Mainly	   to	  France?)	  Like	  other	  modes	  of	  
secularism,	  laïcité	  is	  a	  modern	  form	  of	  political	  rule	  that	  seeks	  
to	   define	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   secular	   subject	   (whether	  
“religious”	  or	  not)	  who	  can	  take	  part	  in	  the	  game	  of	  symbols	  –	  
the	  right	  kind	  of	  conventional	  signs	  –	  to	  demonstrate	  his	  or	  her	  
loyalty	  to	  the	  state.	  (Asad,	  2006:	  106)	  
	  
Law	   is	   a	  key	  player	   in	   this	   game	  of	   symbols.	   	   In	   the	   logic	   that	   circulates	   in	  
public	  controversies	  surrounding	  the	  niqab	  in	  Canada,	  the	  normative	  subject	  
manifests	   political	   belonging	   through	   submission	   to	   law,	   including	   legal	  
ritual,	   procedures,	   and	   traditions.	   	   In	   this	   expression	   of	   the	   contemporary	  
politics	  of	  secularism	  –	  according	  to	  this	  move	  in	  the	  repertoire	  of	  secularism	  
–	  one	  belongs	  to	  Canada	  by	  belonging	  to	  law.	  
	  
The	  appeal	  and	  the	  violence	  of	  submission	  to	  law	  
	  
	   Having	   explored	   some	   of	   the	   social	   and	   political	   dynamics	   involved	  
when	  submission	  to	  law	  becomes	  a	  marker	  for	  civic	  inclusion,	  I	  want	  now	  to	  
consider	   why	   it	   is	   that	   law	   might	   come	   to	   occupy	   this	   potent	   symbolic	  
position	   in	   the	   management	   of	   religious	   diversity.	   	   What	   makes	   the	  
invocation	   of	   law	   and	   legality	   such	   an	   attractive	  move	   in	   service	   of	   liberal	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secularism?	  	  Exploring	  this	  question	  requires	  reckoning	  with	  the	  ideological	  
force	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  	  
	   Liberal	   political	   culture	   is	   virtually	   defined	   by	   its	   anxiety	   about	  
engaging	   difference	   in	   terms	   of	   overarching	   narratives.	   	   It	   is,	   of	   course,	  
liberally	   axiomatic	   that	   the	   state	   has	   no	   standing	   in	   questions	   of	   belief,	   no	  
warrant	   to	   intervene	   in	   matters	   of	   worldview.	   	   But	   the	   anxiety	   around	  
engaging	  in	  such	  issues	  goes	  deeper	  than	  this.	  	  In	  his	  book	  Putting	  Liberalism	  
in	   its	   Place,	   Paul	   Kahn	   describes	   the	   problem	   of	   cultural	   pluralism	   as	   our	  
age’s	  “point	  of	  access	  into	  ethical	  and	  political	  deliberation.”	  	  (Kahn,	  2005:	  1)	  	  
In	  describing	   the	  broad	  differences	   in	   values	  with	  which	   cultural	  pluralism	  
confronts	   us,	   he	   identifies	   a	   central	   anxiety	   that	   afflicts	   liberal	   political	  
culture,	  the	  anxiety	  of	  being	  caught	  between	  the	  universal	  and	  the	  particular:	  
“We	  worry	   about	  moral	   cowardice	   when	  we	   fail	   to	   respond	   critically,	   and	  
about	   cultural	   imperialism	  when	  we	  do	   respond.”	   (Kahn,	   2005:	   1)	   	   To	   this	  
one	  must	  add	  the	  anxiety	  that	  liberal	  political	  culture	  lacks	  the	  resources	  to	  
defend	   a	   position	   about	   metaphysics,	   ontology,	   or	   belief.	   	   It	   is,	   after	   all,	  
precisely	   this	   set	   of	   positions	   that	   liberalism	   asks	   us	   to	   bracket	   when	   we	  
exercise	   political	   authority.10	  	   Met	   with	   claims	   of	   justice	   that	   reason	   from	  
metaphysics,	  how	  is	  the	  liberal	  state	  to	  respond?	  	  And	  so	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  
George	  Grant	  has	  described	  as	  “the	  terrifying	  darkness	  which	  has	  fallen	  upon	  
modern	   justice”	   (Grant,	   1998	   [1974]:	   86):	   the	   felt	   inability	   to	   underwrite	  
public	  norms	  with	  a	  deeper	  account	  of	  metaphysics	  or	  ontology.	  	  	  
	   The	   demand	   for	   obedience	   to	   law	   provides	   escape	   from	   these	  
anxieties.	   	   It	   is	   a	   move	   that	   avoids	   the	   precarious	   terrain	   of	   community	  
narratives	  and	  informing	  worldviews,	  engaging	  instead	  on	  the	  firmer	  footing	  
of	   legality.	   	   Importantly,	   this	   move	   is	   underwritten	   by	   the	   substantial	  
ideological	   force	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   rule	   of	   law.	   	   In	   its	   classic	   Diceyan	  
formulation,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   involves	   above	   all	   else	   the	   idea	   that	   no	   one	   is	  
outside	   of	   or	   beyond	   the	   law.	   	   This	   conception	   of	   legality,	   which	   is	   “the	  
distinctive	   modality	   of	   law”	   according	   to	   influential	   currents	   in	  
contemporary	   jurisprudence	   (Lacey,	   2003:	   15),	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   signal	  
feature	  of	  democratic	  governance,	  a	  marker	  of	  modernity.	   	  “One	  law	  for	  all”	  
has	   such	   resonance	   precisely	   because	   it	   evokes	   commitment	   to	   this	  
fundamental	  tenet	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  In	  a	  liberal	  political	  culture	  there	  is	  an	  
ideological	   and	   rhetorical	   resource	   in	   the	   invocation	  of	   legality	   that	   simply	  
does	   not	   exist	   in	   the	   field	   of	  metaphysics,	   belief,	   and	  worldview.	   	   One	   can,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Whether one draws the line at public reasoning, as Rawls did in his early positions, or in the 
institutional phase of decision-making, like Habermas, the stakes of the line drawing exercise are 
the same: managing the separation of worldview and political power. 
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thus,	  demand	  submission	  to	  law	  where	  the	  demand	  for	  submission	  to	  culture	  
or	   to	   worldview	  would	   seem	   tyrannical.	   	   This	   is	   the	   appeal	   of	   having	   law	  
serve	   the	   key	   symbolic	   role	   that	   I	   have	   tracked	   in	   this	   piece.	   	   With	   the	  
ideological	   force	  of	   the	   rule	  of	   law	   in	   support,	   resort	   to	   law	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  
belonging	  provides	  a	  more	  comfortable	  basis	  for	  making	  a	  claim	  about	  social	  
cohesion	   and	   the	   conditions	   of	   inclusion.	   	   Rather	   than	   overtly	   insisting	   on	  
convergence	   in	  belief	   or	   value,	   the	   claim	  becomes	   simply	   that	   you	  must	  be	  
legal,	  and	  the	   legitimacy	  of	   this	  demand	  is	  a	   function	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law,	  not	  
the	  culture	  of	  the	  community.	  In	  a	  context	  of	  dizzying	  diversity	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  
vulnerability	   within	   public	   culture,	   resort	   to	   the	   law	   as	   the	   ground	   of	  
belonging	  has	  a	  seductively	  simplifying,	  stabilizing	  feel.	  	  	  
To	  state	  it	  otherwise,	  in	  this	  configuration	  of	  law	  and	  civic	  belonging,	  
the	   claim	   for	   submission	   to	   law	   serves	   as	   a	   device	   of	   depoliticization.11	  	   In	  
Regulating	  Aversion,	  Wendy	  Brown	  describes	  depoliticization	  as	  “removing	  a	  
political	   phenomenon	   from	   comprehension	   of	   its	   historical	  emergence	   and	  
from	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  powers	  that	  produce	  and	  contour	  it.”	  (Brown,	  2006:	  
15)	  	  As	  I	  have	  explained,	  in	  liberal	  political	  culture,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  “rule	  of	  
law”	   enjoys	   conceptual	   autonomy	   from	   the	   realm	   of	   culture	   or	   politics.	  	  
Brown	   puts	   it	   as	   follows:	   “secularism,	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   equal	   rights,	   moral	  
autonomy,	  individual	  liberty.	  	  If	  these	  principles	  are	  universal,	  then	  they	  are	  
not	  matters	  of	  culture,	  which	  is	  identified	  today	  with	  the	  particular,	  local,	  and	  
provincial.”	  	  (Brown,	  2006:	  21)	  	  Rule	  of	  law	  is	  simply	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  modern	  
state,	  a	  natural	  element	  of	  democratic	  governance.	  
To	  employ	  submission	  to	  law	  as	  the	  marker	  for	  civic	  belonging	  is,	  thus,	  
a	  move	  that	  seeks	  to	  extract	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  civic	  enculturation	  from	  its	  
political	   and	   historical	   contours.	   	   Rather	   than	   engaging	   in	   debate	   on	  
differences	  in	  value,	  differences	  in	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  self-­‐making	  and	  
autonomous	   choice	   in	   the	  good	   life,	   rather	   than	   subjecting	  public	  norms	   to	  
the	   vulnerability	   of	   open	   contestation	   or	   defending	   the	   supremacy	   of	   one	  
normative	   world	   over	   others,	   one	   can	   appeal	   to	   the	   universality	   and	  
givenness	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law.	   	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  Sharia	  arbitration	  debate	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Although my focus is on the liberal culture of law’s rule, my argument here is sympathetic to 
Nicola Lacey’s criticism of the tendency in contemporary jurisprudence to separate concepts of 
law from the social, political, and institutional conditions in which those concepts emerge.  In 
particular, Lacey is critical of the overconfidence evident in much contemporary analytic 
jurisprudence about the universality and conceptual autonomy of the modal qualities (like legality) 
associated with the rule of law.  As Lacey explains, “[a]t a sufficiently high level of abstraction, 
we can of course produce some conceptions of ‘law’ or ‘legality’ which are more widely 
applicable. But we do so at some cost” (Lacey, 2003: 15).  One of those costs, I suggest, is the 
concealment of the historical and political dimensions of social phenomena. 
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Ontario,	   the	   complicated	   issue	   of	   what	   deep	   religious	   difference	   in	   a	  
multicultural	  society	  might	  imply	  for	  legal	  pluralism	  is	  suppressed	  in	  favor	  of	  
the	   demand	   for	   a	   single	   secular	   state	   bound	   together	   by	   a	   common	   law.	  	  
When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   niqab	   in	   the	   courtroom,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   our	  
historically	   dynamic	   and	   socially	   responsive	   trial	   practices	   might	  
accommodate	  religious	  difference	  blanches	  in	  light	  of	  the	  demand	  to	  conform,	  
like	   all	   citizens,	   to	   legal	   process.	   	   In	   place	   of	   the	   messiness	   of	   community	  
definition	   and	   the	   challenges	   of	   civic	   enculturation	   in	   a	   religiously	   diverse	  
society,	  law	  offers	  a	  symbolic	  tool	  of	  apparent	  solidity,	  clarity,	  and	  neutrality;	  
moreover,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  it	  marks	  civic	  inclusion	  and	  defines	  the	  good	  
citizen,	  this	  demand	  to	  declare	  that	  one	  belongs	  to	  law	  also	  consolidates	  the	  
authority	  of	  the	  secular	  state.	   	  Submission	  to	  law	  thus	  becomes	  a	  singularly	  
appealing	  trope	  in	  the	  project	  of	  liberal	  secularism.	  	  	  
	   Though	   seductive,	   the	   invocation	   of	   law	   as	   the	   ground	   of	   civic	  
belonging	   ultimately	   fails	   in	   its	   project	   of	   depoliticization.	   	   The	   hope,	   as	   I	  
have	  described	  it,	  is	  that	  by	  defining	  civic	  belonging	  as	  belonging	  to	  law,	  one	  
can	   bypass	   the	   fraught	   cultural	   dimensions	   of	   civic	   enculturation	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  religious	  diversity.	  	  Law	  serves	  as	  a	  symbolic	  shortcut	  around	  the	  
more	  challenging	  terrain	  of	  metaphysical	  and	  ontological	  difference.	  	  But	  the	  
success	   of	   this	   technique	   depends	   upon	   two	   reductions.	   	   Law	   must	   be	  
denatured	   as	   a	   cultural	   artefact,	  while	   religion	   is	   denatured	   as	   a	   source	   of	  
normative	  obligation.	  	  Only	  with	  these	  “flattenings”	  in	  place	  can	  the	  conceit	  of	  
pacification	  subsist.	  	  Both	  make	  good	  sense	  within	  liberal	  political	  culture,	  in	  
which	  law	  enjoys	  a	  myth	  of	  neutrality	  –	  a	  neutrality	  that	  makes	  it	  the	  possible	  
public	   meeting	   ground	   for	   a	   range	   of	   religious	   and	   cultural	   views	   –	   and	  
religion	  is	  confidently	  assigned	  to	  the	  private	  realm	  of	  preference,	  habit,	  and	  
culture.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  private/public	  distinction	  so	  important	  to	  liberalism	  
makes	  plausible	  the	  claim	  that	  law	  can	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  social	  cohesion.	  
	   Outside	  the	  conceits	  of	  liberal	  political	  culture	  the	  idea	  of	  belonging	  to	  
law	   looks	   very	   different,	   indeed.	   	   If	   one	   takes	   seriously	   the	   link	   between	  
belief	  and	  conduct,	  religion	  resists	  the	  confines	  of	  private	  sphere	  and	  makes	  
normative	  demands	  on	  public	  conduct.	  	  Equally,	  the	  thickly	  cultural	  nature	  of	  
the	   rule	   of	   law	   becomes	   apparent	   as	   one	   sees	   it	   as	   a	   distinctive	   way	   of	  
imagining	   the	   world,	   a	   contingent	   expression	   of	   a	   particular	   political	   and	  
even	   religious	  history,	   a	  way	  of	   conceiving	  of	   time,	   space,	   authority,	   and	  of	  
what	   is	  of	  ultimate	  value	   in	   the	  human	  subject.	   (Berger,	  2008;	  Kahn,	  1999)	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   very	   way	   in	   which	   law	   imagines	   religion	   is	   an	   artefact	   of	   its	  
liberal	   cultural	   commitments	   (See	  Berger,	  2007).	   	  However	   justified	   such	  a	  
demand	   might	   ultimately	   be	   in	   a	   liberal	   democracy,	   the	   demand	   for	  
obedience	   to	   state	   law	   can	   denude	   religious	   belonging	   of	   its	   normative	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implications.	  	  Equally,	  to	  submit	  to	  law	  is	  to	  yield	  to	  a	  thick	  cultural	  narrative.	  	  
For	  communities	  of	  deep	  religious	  difference,	  this	  is	  the	  cultural	  violence	  that	  
subsists	  beneath	  the	  liberally	  appealing	  demand	  that,	  in	  a	  secular	  society,	  we	  
must	   all	   belong	   to	   law.	   	   It	   is	   this	  experience	  of	   submission	   to	   law	   for	   those	  
who	   are	   not	   already	   committed	   to	   the	   project	   of	   liberal	   secularism	   that	  
means	  that	  the	  aspiration	  of	  depoliticization	  will	  never	  entirely	  succeed.	  	  It	  is	  
not	  so	  easy	  to	  belong	  to	  law.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion:	  law,	  secularism,	  and	  synecdoche	  
	  
One	  available	  move	  within	   the	  politics	   and	  patterns	  of	   secularism	   is	  
the	  migration	  of	  law	  into	  a	  potent	  metaphorical	  position,	  whereby	  law	  begins	  
to	   stand	  as	   a	   kind	  of	   synecdoche	   for	   the	   secular	   state.	   	  Within	   a	   context	   of	  
deep	  religious	  diversity,	  submission	  to	  law	  serves	  as	  a	  diagnostic	  marker	  of	  
civic	  belonging	  and	  of	   the	  due	  enculturation	  demanded	  of	   the	  good	  citizen.	  	  
With	  this,	  law	  stands	  in	  to	  define	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  whole	  of	  which	  it	  is	  
but	   a	   part	   –	   political	   community.	   	   Contemporary	   Canadian	   debates	   about	  
religious	  difference	  and	  civic	  inclusion	  show	  how	  this	  role	  for	  law	  may	  arise,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  social	  and	  political	  dynamics	  that	  it	  sets	  in	  motion.	  	  At	  a	  time	  at	  
which	  the	  possibility	  for	  productive	  engagement	  across	  divergent	  narratives	  
seems	   daunting,	   when	   the	   community’s	   self-­‐understanding	   is	   subject	   to	  
intense	   contestation,	   law	   has	   assumed	   this	   metaphorical	   role	   in	   which	  
submission	  to	  law	  comes	  to	  represent	  community	  belonging.	  	  In	  the	  context	  
of	   disputes	   about	   the	   limits	   of	   toleration	   and	   accommodation	   in	   a	  
multicultural	  but	  secular	  society,	  adherence	  to	  law	  offers	  itself	  as	  comforting	  
evidence	   of	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	   particular	   (and	   culturally,	   historically	  
specific)	  configuration	  of	  the	  public	  and	  private,	  respect	  for	  the	  assignation	  of	  
religion	  to	  the	  private	  realm,	  and	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  rational	  autonomy	  
as	   a	   condition	   of	   liberty.	   	   And	   so,	   bypassing	   the	   normative	   complexity	   of	  
diversity,	  we	  increasingly	  lean	  on	  the	  ideological	  force	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  
demand	  instead,	  simply,	  that	  you	  belong	  to	  law.	  	  	  
The	  impulse	  to	  adopt	  this	  role	  for	  law	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  
the	   search	   for	   the	   ties	   that	   will	   bind	   in	   a	   society	   characterized	   by	   deep	  
diversity.	   	   	   Finding	   such	   points	   of	   common	   ground	   is	   no	   doubt	   imperative	  
and	  the	  search	  is	  not	  just	  essential,	  but	  the	  ethical	  foundation	  of	  living	  within	  
cultural	  diversity.	  	  There	  are	  risks,	  however,	  in	  looking	  to	  law	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  
these	   ties.	   	  One	  worries	   that	   such	  reliance	  on	   law	  consolidates	  authority	   in	  
too	   narrow	   a	   group	   of	   social	   actors.	   	   Furthermore,	   reliance	   on	   the	  
synecdoche	  of	   law	   leaves	   too	   little	   room	  for	  normative	  difference;	   it	  denies	  
the	  legal	  pluralism	  that	  is	  a	  fact	  of	  our	  modern	  existences	  and	  reifies	  law	  in	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an	   unduly	   monolithic,	   statist,	   and	   exclusive	   form,	   depriving	   us	   of	   the	  
normative	   biodiversity	   that	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   attractive	   features	   of	  
multiculturalism.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   form	   of	   political	   belonging	   imagined	  
through	  this	  insistence	  on	  submission	  to	  law	  is	  an	  impoverished	  one,	  bereft	  
of	   the	   richness	   brought	   through	   contestation	   and	   resistance.	   	   Yet	   the	  
principal	   risk	   is	   that	   this	   resort	   to	   law	   will	   simply	   be	   too	   successful	   in	  
obscuring	  the	  political	  dimensions	  –	  the	  violence,	  history,	  power	  –	   involved	  
in	   the	   definition	   of	   civic	   community.	   	   It	   is	   too	   easy,	   under	   the	   conceits	   of	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